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In a book meriting thorough-going elucidation, Landshut seeks to lay bare
the roots of the "possible unfolding" of the problems of sociological research.
His investigation takes the form of a "critiqueof sociology," which springs from
a "confrontation with outmoded and prevailing research tendencies.II Besides
unearthing the original ground of the sociological problematic (Problematilc), the
author seeks to prove that this ground has been lost as the social sciences have
developed historically, and that the "originally motivating mode of questioning"
is no longeralive in "contemporary research trends" (p. 7).
This critique thus rests on a definite presupposition. An "original research
foundation," specifically a "factual questionability ffaJctische Fraglichkeitl of
,::~~~fif/~,~> reality" (p. 10), is assumed as decisive, giving meaning not only to the
~~~~'>~>":' historical formation of the sociological problematic but also to the objective
.:~', . . authenticity (Ech/heit) and inauthenticity of its claims. "Our search for the mode
of: :~\~;, !~;: ~ ...~.~... ot inquiry tha! ?riginally motivated soc.iolo~y ~ a science rests i~ particularon
·~·.·~I~ 'i-;~~ 00:' thepresupposmon that such a modeof mquuy IS by no means arbitrary, but that
.~~~~~r.~ .~ \;.~. it has a particular connection to the objectof scientific labor, a connection which
" ~;:~~ ;;< ':: is ultimately grounded in some way in the essenceof the things themselves" (p.
.;c:~~.::.:r ..~ 7). The starting point of inquiry (Landshut's"factualquestionabilityof reality"
);~. ': as "concretely meaningful") is determined by the substantive character
·~·(4-it~,:.:'2.JSachCharakler) of the disciplineand its "methodology."
~':":';>-;~-:: This presupposition, which' is and remains the ground of the whole of
~:-/:~:,.:~hut's critique,will be discussed furtherbelow.
.~~:;;:::~:;}>:::. The "factual questionability of reality" -- the "originalresearch foundation"
~~~i{,W:~ich permits, shapes, and carries forward the problematic of sociological
:\:7~~ienc~-- is shown to spring from "bourgeoissociety," which, in its opposition
:';/\lqJhestate and "personality," figures as the arena in which claims to freedom
;~fu~~,equality aresupposedto befulfilled.
~lW~4~i:ymdshut then shows"society" to be factually the "sourceof all freedom and
>;~~~p:.
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unfreedom" through a defmit.e development and transformation in the "Christian-
Germanic understanding of life.II This shift is marked by a growing
extemalization (Yerdusserlichung) of the Christian notion of the "truedestiny of
people" and their "properlife." State and societycannotassumethe decisiverole
in the fulfillmentof human destiny until, to a growing extent, the "inner and
inalienable" Christian freedom and equalityof individuals beforeGod becomes an
external freedom and equality of choice in the,world, i.e., when the "inner
freedom to choose" is transferred "from the conflict between people and their
drives to the relations of individuals and the lawful order of life-with-others" (p,
150). Now humanity, with its "pathosof claims to freedomand equality," steps
out of inwardness into concrete social reality and -- finds itself "disappointed" to
the core, with "hopes" yielding "disillusionment," "And thus the circle is drawn,
in which the original social problem must be grasped as a real problem of
unfulfilled hopes" (p. 116).
According to Landshut, this antagonism between human direction
(Bestimmung) and worldlyfulfillment (Eifal/ung) leads to yet another decisive
shift in the outlook on "the situation of humans in the world": Humanity and
worldhavecomeinto "disjunction," framed as autonomous, separate"potencies"
whichlater assumea functional or even causal "relationship," so that ultimately
even humans can beconceived as the "products of their relationships." And it is
on exactly this basis that the presupposition is given for the central tendencyof
sociological researchsinceLorenzvon Steinand Marx: that social realitycan be
construed in termsof "actionfactors" (WirkungsfaJctoren), and that one of these
factors (production relations) contains the decisive lever for the fulfillment
(Erfal/ung) of the true telos (Bestimmung) of humanity, the "emancipation of
humankind." The "disjunction of humanity and world" is thus only "the
presupposition for the anticipation of a resolution of personal prospects arising
from the organization and transfonnation of society"(p. 152). (Thisdisjunction
of humanity and worldwillbe discussed moreextensively below.)
Thebestparts of this bookare those in whichevidence is offered to account
for thisdevelopment: in particular the analysisof Lorenz von Stein'sorientation
-and the elucidation'of decisive tendencies in Rousseau and in the theory of
neturalright.I Landshutsucceeds in showingthat such a development has taken
place and in elaborating its mainstages -- but the interpretationthat he brings to
thisdevelopment mustbe strongly opposed.
It wouldcorrespond to thesenseand presupposition of Landshut's critique to
see the constitution of a wholly "inner," "inalienable" human destiny and
freedom as an expression of the "disjunction of humanity and world" which
1. In Reason and Revolution ([1941] 1960, pp. 374ff.), Marcuse devotes a
section of his chapter on positivism and the rise of sociology to an
analysisof von Stein, whom he credits with a leadingrole in the shift from
dialectical to positiviststylesof thought.
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Landshut so sharply condemns in Marx. But at exactly this point the historical
deconstruction (Destruktion) stops!2 Indeed, it almostseems as if Landsh~t sees
the "shift" in inner human prospects to be in reality only a misunderstandmg of
the "true" (Christian) definition of humanity and of ~e ~n~ient, especially
Aristotelian determination of Being, an "excuipadon" of individuals from their
original responsibility: "in this wayall the catego~es that originally dete~in~
the individual person as human -- freedom, happiness -- a~qulfe ~e~lngs ~n
which individuals are disregarded save as 'products of their relatio~s '. an~ In
which their hopes and claims are derived from these (the orders and msutuuons
of life-with-others)" (pp. 1541). As the result of an en~ea~or !asting c~ntDr!es,
the individual was first "derived" from the "ordersand msutunons of life-with-
others"· this "derivation", in turn, "dispensed" the individual from his true
destiny'(Bestimmung) "as man,". whose chanceof self-realization in actual social
life was seemingly none of his business!3 Such a view is doubtless the most
crass "disjunction of humanity and world" imaginable! .
It is not presupposed in this separation of man and world that man In
society has "expectations" for his critical potentialities,but rather the.re~erse:
that the original union of human and world is sundered: by th~ restnc~on of
decisivehuman possibilities to the sphere of the innerand internalized, to mw~
insteadof objectivefreedom. Man need notbe "exiled" (''Verweisung'') to social
life as the field of his "realization" ("ErfiJllung"); he is, rather,wholly dependent
upon it, andcanonly be expelled from itby force.
. This state, of affairs was still plain in antiquity. We know that the
Aristotelian definitionof man as "objectively slave" ("seinsmiissig Sklave") and .
"objectively master" refers to the human "constitution of Being" as .such (p,
123); in spite or precisely because of this, the actual fa~ of man, hIS ~ctual
freedom and unfreedom, remains in view! Since, for Aristotle, the being of
humans is constitutedby facticity-- includingthe social -- a great deal could be
"expected" from the worldly unfolding of de.cisive h~man f~c.ulties. For
Aristotle, the world is not given to the wholly Inner or Internah~ed; even ~e
most "inward"possibilities, those ·of the bios theoretikos, require a definite
ordering capacity (Verfugenskonnen) which in no way extends only to
"theoretical conduct" as'such.4 Andtherefore the Aristotelian "einic" culminates
2. The Heideggerian termDestruaion is commonly rendered "deconstruction."
Marcuse's connotation here is similar.
3. Marcuse often uses the terms Mensch and Mensche«, which canI be
translated as either "man" or "human," "men" or "humanity..t Un ess
Marcuse uses genderedpronounsas well, we will render these terms using
gender-neutral language.
4. This is a reference to Aristotle's Politics, paragraphs 1324 and 13~5
(wrongly listed as "1314" in Marcuse's original article). Marcuse IS
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in and completes itself in "politics," which is certainly not limited to an
"ontology of man" as zoonpolitikon.S
It is not that a departure from the true Christian definition of the social
reality of mankind converts the possible realization of this destiny into an
"illusion." Instead, Christian inalienability (Unverausserlichkeit) derives from
the disjunction of objectiveconnection between humanityand world, and in the
social realm this illusion(inalienability) is repeatedlyexposed. The prospects of
humanity are neither internalnor external, but transcend this opposition. Hence,
the social problematicdoes not develop only through an externa1ization of the
internal,but is already given in humanexistence. That it becameso pronounced
in bourgeois society, where it was apprehendedthroughsociologicalresearch, is
a fact rootedin the historical developmentof society itself.
With these formal considerations behind us, we now tum to Landshut's
critique of sociology per see Sociology today, according to Landshut, has
adopted a methodological approach which springs from the disjunction of man
and world as it derived from a changing social reality but is divorced from the
living research traditionwhich this separationoriginallyinspired. This "rupture"
explains the inner emptiness and formlessness of inquiry, the "pushing away"
(Abdrilngung) or reduction of reality to simple "examples," the conversion of
problematicsocial facticity into an "irrelevant object of scientific analysis," as
Landshut shows with typical examples drawn from the work: of P. Barth,
Oppenheimer, Simmel, Spann, TODDies, and Vierkandt (pp. llff). For Lorenz
von Stein and Marx, and again for Max Weber (whose point of departure and
research aims Landshut analyzes more profoundly than traditionalinterpreters),
the decisiveproblem of sociology was the concrete questionability of historical
reality; this problemhas since been forgotten or has becomean abstractobject of
"pure" science. For Landshut this is not only a methodological mistake, but
affects the "fundamental character" of sociologyas science. Since the object of
sociological inquiry is historical by nature, sociology renounces its subject
matter when this "historicity" (Geschichtlichkeit) is either overlooked or
"distilled" into a.form "pure". of historicity.. Hence, sociology must once again
referring to Aristotle's claim that "the active life need not, as some
suppose,be always concerned with our relations with other people, nor is
intelligence 'active' only when it is directed towards results that flow from
action. On the contrary, thinking and speculation that are their own end
and are done for theirown sake are more 'active',becausethe aim (telos) in
such thinking is to do well (eupraxia), and thereforealso, in a sense, action
(praxis). Master-craftsmen in particular, even though the actions they
direct by their intelligence are external to them, are nevertheless said ID
'act', in a sovereignsense." Aristotle (1981),p.401.
5. I plan to advance a proof of this point in another place through a closer
interpretation of Aristotle's Politics. [Marcuse]
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return to the themesof the specific "historical-social problematic" from whichit
grew and to which it is bound as science, "even if it must firsr saw off the
branchon which it sits" (p. 155).
A critique of sociology is among the most pressing scientific tasks. But
there must be clarity about what embarking on such a critique implies. This
critique is most often shunted aside from the start with the objection that
sociology is still too young for a radical critique, that it has not yet constituted
itself as a science and secured its foundations, that it is still in the midst of
performing its first concreteresearch - henceits innerandouter unevenness and
uncertainty.
Such objections must not be allowed to inhibit critique, since the issue is
not to question this or that direction in sociology, this or that method of inquiry,
but the overall feasibility of sociologyas a science(Wissenschaft). The question
is precisely if and how sociology can be constituted as an autonomous science.
The point, again, is not to deny this claim, but to secure it or 10circumscribe it.
Sucha critiquecan only affect sociology as a scienceof thecharacters, laws,
and forms of social being, i.e., as a "pure" or "general" sociology (the label is
not important here), and not concrete sociological investigation, whose claim
cannot be exposed to the same critique as long as it remainsaware of its own
limits and presuppositions (i.e., does not go beyond concreteness to a "pure"
sociology or encroach on the objective problematic of philosophy). And the
critiqueof "pure"sociologyneedsa groundfrom whichto assesswhat sociology
wishes to and can discern about social being: a ground that must be truly
"fundamental," which no longer opposes standpoint to standpoint, but
establishes the originalpossibility of any propositions about social being. This
ground can only be provided and established by philosophy. The essential
characteristics, laws,and forins of social beingas a fundamental modeof hwnan
being can be probedonly by philosophy.6
For such a philosophicalcritique of sociology Landshutprovides two very
important preliminaries: the designation of historicity as the substantive
.character(Sachcharakter) of the sociological discipline andtheexposition oCthe
"disjunction of bumanity and..world" as the methodological presupposition of
sociological research. It is precisely because Landshut uncovers the central
problematic of sociology in this way that his analysis must be keenly
scrutinized. Is his analysisadequateto the problem?
No.1: the Sachcharakier of the thematic domains (Gebietes) of sociologyas
historical reality and narrative(Landshutmakesno distinction between these two
6. We will try to providea more detailedexplanation of this thesiselsewhere;
in-direct support is furnished by the" sociological camp, since, as we can
demonstrate, social being in its basic sense and basic character is
unexplained in sociology it-self, indeed remains an open question,at best
adaptedfrom somephilosophy. [Marcuse]
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concepts). Landshut first mentions this Sachcharakter in connection with a
reading of Max Weber's work on "Objectivity' in Social Science and Social
Policy" (p. 2).7 This does not, in itself, warrant methodological objections; but
Landshutdoes not advance beyond received formulations. The result is that an
approachwhich, for MaxWeber, given his very different intentions, was suited
to the problem,becomes in Landshut's study a palpable error. For Max Weber,
as even the title of his cited essay makes clear, the question is primarily one of
"epistemological" contemplation (Besinnung), and the real subject matter of the
social scientific problem is illumined only in this light. Yet a critique which
seeksto question the substantive characterof the sociological disciplineprecisely
in its "original" condition, apart from its manifestation in sociological method,
cannot remain at this level. And for Landshut, Max Weber's epistemological
formulations remain in the forefrontof all attempts to identifythis Sachcharakter
as historicity. But historicityas the objective determinacy (Seinsbestimmung)
of social reality cannot be adequately distinguished and explained through a
textbook-like characterization of concepts such as "context of motivation and
meaning" (p. 9), "concretecontexts" (p. 10), "individualeffectiveness contexts"
(p. 13). Does Landshut really believe that he has said anything about "social-
historical reality" when he writes, "Reality means: 10 be motivated in this or
that way"? (p. 25) In Dilthey, whom Landshut cites several times, there is
sufficientguidanceOIl how to pursue a genuinedetenninationof historicity. The
principal questionis Ihemannerin which the historically addressedobjectarises;
how it is related to itself and other objects, etc. Historicitymust be grasped and
determinedas motility (Bewegtheit), not as an epistemiccondition.
Not until the objective character of historical reality is clarified can
something definite be said, as well, about the relationship between the
substantive problematicof sociological science and the "factualquestionability
of reality" as its "original research basis." It is hence not by chance that this
nexus terminates for Landshut in the darkness of "in some fashion" (p. 7) and
must remain .obscure until it is shown whether and how sociology can
'.'reproduce" its "original situation," whether-it-can do~this· asa science, how its
substantive problematic changesin the process, etc,
No.2: the "disjunction .of humanity and' world;ft'For-Landshut the
juxtaposition of humanity and world as "powers for themselves" ("Potenzen fur
sich"), which are then "brought into union (Verbindung) with one another
through a determinate schemaof relations" (p. 68), is a procedurederived from
Marx throughMax Weber which now figures as the "basic presupposition" of
sociological method (p. 80). Indeed, this disjunction. between humanity and
worldhasbecomethe basisoftoday's sociological research to such anextent that
its tt fundamental scientificcharacter" is called into question. This wouldbe even
more apparent given proof that, due to this disjunction, historicity has been
7. Max Weber([1904] 1949).
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eradicatedas the substantivecharacter of ihe discipline. Landshutdoes not give
this proof, however,since historicity as Sachcharokter has not becomea problem
for him. He sticks to the statement that the world is not a "structure" (Aufbau)
or "system (Gefuge) of realms of being," "in which man -- an empty X in
himself -- resides," but rather, the "life-world of people, which looks like this
becausepeople are like this, because the world is nothing but a manifestationof
this self-understanding" (p. 90). Can Landshut satisfy himself with this
statement because he believes that (like the whole frameworkof the problem) it
has alreadybeen elaborated elsewhere? But thenat leasta reference to Heidegger
would have been in place! Perhaps through. such a reference the whole
orientation of Landshut's emphasis on the concrete "original research basis"
would have beenclearer in its justificationand meaning.
Landshut sees the "rupture of humanity and world" in its sharpest form in
Marx. We must delve further into Landshut's account of Marx. It typifies the
uncertainty with whichmany people confrontMarx,even when the requisites for
real understanding are fully present and the premises of Marx's research are
rightly perceived. Landshut interprets Marx's research orientationin connection
with the issue of the concrete original situation (Ursprungssituation) of
sociology. He finds the true sense of thisorientation in the "tendency towards
transformation in the world": "From the outset Marx's whole work is geared
towards this transfonnation of reality. His whole inquiry begins here, and
inasmuch as he inquires into true reality, he never tires of stressing that
everything depends on concretion, the here and now; reality revealed itself to
Marx from the start only under the aspect of its possible transformability" (p.
67). And this alteration of reality has as its task "the emancipation of
humanity."
It is precisely because Landshut grasps theproper sense of Marx's point of
departure that his further interpretations makeso little sense; they represent a
completeinversionof thetruestate of affairs.
Landshutdeduces fromMarx'spremise"that, in general, a divisionof person
-·-andworld is assumed, a division in which the person·isa function of the- world"·
(p.74). We reproduce his argumenthere, since its utter lack of support leaps 10
the eyes of all who Can read: "That..in general .the transformation of reality is
expected to contribute something to the emancipation of humanity contains a
specific preconception of the situation of people in the world: Humanity and
worldare brought into disjunction, establishedas powersfor themselves, and are
then brought into union with one another through a determinate schema of
relations" (p. 69).
Apart fromcontradicting the formula quotedabove - namely,thatpeopleare
a "functionof the world" (p.74) -- this conclusion is derived "purely logically,"
withoutregard for the circumstances to be interpreted, and is thus false from the
start! It should read instead: If the transformation of reality is expected to
contribute something to the emancipation of humanity,people must "belong" to
the world from the start, in such a way that they cannot face it in disjunctionas
anindependent power! .
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But let us shift from these formal "arguments" to ~e interpreted te~ts
themselves. When Marx speaks of the interac~ons or ~elabons bet~een SOCial
being and consciousness, humanity andproducnon relations,economic ~ase and
ideological superstructure, etc., he is not offeri~g a"~chema of supen!DP~se~
relationsbetween "powersin and for themsel~e~, an unmanent dett:nnlnauon
(Etgengesetzlichkeit) of the world in ~pposltJOn. ~ people or the like, ~U! an
account of the basic structural condition of thea Inherent, c~ncr~~ original
association: human being as historical. In this "!'ay, and onl! m thl~ w~y, can
the "transformation" of reality mean somethl~g for the emancipauon of
humans," indeed for emancipation purely and SImply, not ~~ause th~, world
affects humansas a different "substance" but rather because It belongs to the
inner being of humanity itself, constituting its "substance." It IS precisely the
overcoming of the traditional dichotomy betw~n. human and world that
characterized Marx'smodeof inquiry from the beginning, One has only to r~
the "Theseson Feuerbachtt and the openingof The German Ideology, where tlus
overcoming is expressly described as decisive for the new research! Note, to
start, the subsequently deleted section of the first parag~ph [of!he German
Ideology]: "We know only one science, the ~ience of history, HIStory can be
viewed from two angles...divided into the history of nature and the history of
people. The two sides, however•...are not to be ~parat~;.as long as ~ple
exist, the history of natureand the history ofh~ty con~bon each ~~er "(p.
237).8 And then follow, in ever-different formu!aUons, the P!esupposlbons ~f
the new method: the rejection of every abstraction of humamtyor the.w?rld m
itself, the affmnationof "realindivid~" in the f~ll concreteness of thea actual
life processes" in their "actual empincally plain development process.under
specificconditions." Further Connulations in ~he German lde?'ogy, thi~ first
clear elucidationof the "materialistic view ~f hIStory." ar~ possible only In the
elaboration of this approach: the person IS no longer viewed ~ an ab~tract
"species being" (Gauungswesen), approachable anddefi~le.as Bemg for-l~lf,
but rather as concrete historical life in the con~rete hlstorlc~ world; neither
. htfilfanity" nor"world" is an independentpower which ~".be related t~ the 0t!ter
only.pQst.hoc.~~~e .two",JJ!l"i~t. ~~~~rt ~~" form "~ .~~41~sQI~bl~ umty, Whl~h
.'exists and can be understoodfrom the beginning, This premise IS not lost WIth
8. This passage is cited by Marcuse from the. 192~ edi~on. of theth0pe~~~
chapter of The German Ideology. He cites It again In.ano er .
Gesellschaft article (Marcuse [1931] 1978, p. 481). A vanant rend~nng
appears in the Marx-Engels Collected Works: ."We know only ~ smgle
science,the scienceof history. One can loo~ at history from two slde~ and
divide it into the history of nature and the history of me~. The two Sides,
however are inseparable; the history of nature and the history of men aredepende~t on each other so long as men exist," Marx and Engels ([1846]
1976). p. 28.
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the later turn to pure economy, but is driven forward on exactly the same basis
in the "Introduction to the Critique of Political Economy."9 Here we find
further explicit formulations, placed into bold relief by the maxim that the
categories are only "existence forms, determinations of existence"
(Daseinsformen, EXistenzbestimmungen)."10 The simple fact that one of the
main tendencies of Marxianeconomy is to divest theobjectivity of theeconomic
worldof its reified character (Dingcharakter) by grasping its originin concretely
historical human conduct is already proof that the ontological (seinsmassige)
union of human and world, taken in full concretion, is the premise and
foundation of Marx's pure economy. It is only on the basis of this premise, as
well, that the "doctrine of ideology"can be understood, accordingto which all
consciousness and its forms is "nothing other" than "conscious being," that is,
the "actuallife process" of people (Deutsche Ideologie, p. 239). This ideology
doctrine, in its original sense, is not subject to the constraint of an undiseussed,
presupposed materialism, but springs from the pursuit of an inquiry into this
concrete unionof humanand worldas historicity.
Now how does Landshut interpret the Marxian..call for the "emancipation of
humanity"? "It must first be seen how humanity is approached in Marx. and
consequently what emancipationmeans to him" (p.68). And the answer: "The
truly human emancipation, which brings man into his true destiny
(Bestimmung), is the one which makes him a species being: the nue human
reality is to be an exemplar of a species. For Marx in general, the person
becomes relevant only as an exemplar, if onlyan exemplarof particularization.
of privateexistence-- as bourgeois" (p. 71).
9. This refers to the famous "Einleinmg" of 1857, whichfirst appearedin Die
Neue Zeit, 1 (23-25), in Stuttgart in 1902-1903. This .was Marx's
mttoolictioittb.the bulkY "roiigh draft" of hiscritiqueof politlcai eCoii"omy,
nowrenowned asthe Grundrisse. -See Marx, Grundrisse ([1857-58]--1973). _.
10. Marcuse found these phrases near the end of the "Einleitung" (see Note 8,
above). They appear in Marx, Grundrisse ([1857-58] 1953). p. 26; cf.
Marx ([1857-58] 1986) and ([1857-58] 1973) for translations. Marx's point
-- that all immediate historical and economic categories comprise
Existenzforms of underlying social realities -- is pivot-al to the whole of
his later analysis of value in Capital. Marcuse sees this,and drawsout the
resemblance between Marx's languageof Daseinsformen and Heidegger's
parallel vocabulary. Robert Pippin (1988, p, 83) is hence in error to
believe that, in Reason and Revolution ([1941] 1960, p. 274), when
Marcuse cites this phrase again, he is "inserting in the text, ...without
elaboration and defense, ...notions crucial to the Heideggerian period,
'Daseinsformen' and 'Existensbestimmungen'."
23
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As evidence for this interpretation a few passages are quoted from the
"Introduction to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Law," in which Marx
does indeed use the expression "species being" in connection with the problem of
emancipation.1I At precisely this point Landshut could well have demonstrated
his method of clarifying these notions by returning to their "concrete original
situation." Perhaps then he would have realized that the notion of "species" in
Marx does not signify what we generally mean by this term today; it is not an
abstract generality which finds its particularization only in mere "exemplars. It
Here, rather, species refers exactly to the fulfJ.llmentof the whole person in the
whole environment Illmwelt), in contrast to the "dehumanized" existence of
mere individuals in capitalist society (Nachlass 1, p. 414).12 Perhaps then
Landshut would have traced the use of this notion to Hegel's Logic, where
"species" appears as one of the categories of life -- as a "result of the life
process," as a "living totality."13
Moreover, for a substantive interpretation, it is impermissible for Landshut
to seek answers to his question exclusively in the essays in the Deutsch-
franzosischen Jahrbilchern. He asserts that there "alone is to be found the
implicit presupposition, the foundation of the whole analysis of political
economy in Capital" (p. 69).14 This is doubly false. First, when Landshut's
book was written, a volume of great importance for his theme had probably
already appeared: The German Ideology. 15 Second, Landshut fails to see that
Marxsoon abandoned the standpoint of the Deiasch-franzosischen Jahrbucher,
11 . Marx drafted his "Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of
Law" in 1843; the introduction alone was published in 1844 in a yearbook
edited by Marxand Ruge, the Deutsch-Framosische Jahrbucner. The full
text is available in Marx([1843] 1975), pp. 3-129.
12. This. refers to one.of the.earliestanthologies of Marx's writings: Marx et
ale ([1841-43] 1902), editedby FnmzMehrin~.
13. See Hegel's Science ofLogic ([1812] 1969). Hegel discusses species (and
"genus") in Section 3, Chapter 1: "Life" (pp.761ff.).
14. See Marx ([1867] 1976), edited by Ernest Mandel.
15 . This is an accurate guess, since the most relevant sections of The German
Ideology were available to Landshut when his book appeared in 1929.
Soon passages from this hitherto unpublished manuscripthad fast appeared
in print in socialist journals in 1903-D4and 1913. The opening chapter on
Feuerbach, which is the source of most of the passages cited by Marcuse,
first appeared in German in 1926. Six years later the complete text
appeared in theso-called MEGA: see MarxandEngels (1932).
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especially on the question "of the concrete elaboration of the problem of
emancipation. The ground of the critique of political economy lies not in the
abstract formulations of these essays, but in the new insights into the structure
of capitalist society which he achieved by pursuing the approach sketched above
-- by delving deeper into the structure of social being per see Once humanity and
world were conceived in their union as historicity, Marx could no longer uphold
a notion as unhistorical as species, and so he polemicized against it quite
vehemently. In the "Theses on Feuerbach," he criticized Feuerbach for
acknowledging the "person" only as an "absnactum," "only as species" (p.
229).16 And in The German ldeoloqy he ridiculed the designation of people as
"species beings" as a pure fancy of so-called "philosophical" contemplation:
"When this development of individuals is contemplated...philosophically, it is
easily possible to imagine that in these individuals we have the species or
mankind, or humanity in its development; a delusion, which gives history a
hearty slap in the face" (p.288).17
16. See Marx's "Theses on Feuerbach" ([1845] 1976, pp. 6-8). In the sixth
thesis, Marx writes: "the essence of man is no abstraction inherent in each
single individual. In its reality it is the ensemble of social relations."
Feuerbach fails to see this, however, and is forced by the logic of his views
to "abstract from the historical process...and to presuppose an abstract --
isolated -- human individual." Hence, "the essence of man...canwith him
be regarded only as 'species', as an inner, mute, general character which
unites the many individuals only in a 1IlJturai way."
17 . See Marx ([1846] 1976), p. 77. Marx speaks here of the "development of
individuals, which proceeds within the common conditions of estates and
classes, historically following one another"; he adds: .....if this
r ····&veiopment is considered from a ·p·hilosophical point of view, it is
. certainly very easy to imagine that in theseindividuals the species.orman,
. has evolved, or that they evolved man -- and in this way one can give
history some hard clouts on the ear." Marx does not actually use the
phrase "species being," but he's clearly disdainful of the abuse of the
"species" concept. Elsewhere (p. 52) he calls the idea that society evolves
as the "self-generation of the species" a "speculative-idealistic, i.e.,
fantastic" surrogate for a genuinely historical view; earlier (p. 29) he
remarked that the concept "species" is simply a secularized version of
Hegel's mystified notion of transcendental substance. In his manuscript
..Alienated Labor" ([1844] 1964, pp. 126-27) -- as in other early writings
that first appeared in 1932 -- Marx does speak of alienation from "species
being." By this he means, however, only that the individual "makes the
community... his-object" and, in so doing, acquires the freedom conferred
by participation in the "universal" dimension of social life. Marx thus
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for Hegel, people' are truly nothing more than organs of the principle of
movement in the world, then it is truly inconceivable that a disjunction of
humanity and world could develop; since, on the contrary, this "instrument" can
be so little divided from the "self-determined movement" of reason that reason
can moveonly in and throughthese instruments. And it remainswholly unclear
why, for Hegel, "in this manner...all meaning- and motivation-relations ~om~
causally regulated networks of effective relations
(Wirkungszusammenhilngen).19 The category of causality appears in Hegel
under the category of Essence and already finds its supersession (Aufhebung)
there; in the dimension of authentic Being, the "Notion," it has no further
meaning.20
thoroughly identical has been particularly misleading...and has covered up
the original meaning of the entire Logic.•." Hegel's claim makes sense,
Marcuseobserves,only if we accept the ideaof anabsoluteknowingego as
the subject of history;and it is precisely Hegel's merit, Marcuse feels, that
until the jarring conclusionof the Logic. his argumentdoes not depend.o~
this assumption. This is we, he says, of the Phenomenology of Spirit
[1807] 1977)as well.
19. The translation of this awkward term -is borrowed from Seyla Benhabib
(1987, p. xvii). A variant rendering is that of Mic~ael Allen Gillespie
(1984, p. 145), who writesof "a natural processof ac~on ~ r~bon, ..:3
chain of causes and effects(Wirkungszusammenhang). Gillespies study IS
one of the most insightful books yet written on the HegeI/Heidegger
nexus.
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To be sure, Marx never explained what the liberated humanity of classless
society would look like at the terminus of radical emancipation. This, however,
was not because the liberated person was an abstract exemplar of a species but
becauseemancipation was alwaysfor Marx an unfolding [Geschehen) of concrete
social being, so that the manner and meaning of its construction could only be
determined in a historical situation in which emancipation had become urgent.
The existence (Dasein) posited by Marx as the union of person and world is
historical in its Being (Sein). The what- and how-being of humanity and the
what- and how-being of the "world" constitute themselves first and only in
"history" -- in the concrete unfolding of existence (Geschehen des Daseins).
Thus, for Marx, there is no "true reality" or human freedom which could be
defined from the start as the goal of emancipation; even the most radical
liberation and freedom is always liberationand freedom ~- and for the concrete
situation in which it occurs.
It is primarily in transforming and in being transformed that existence
(Dasein) is historical. Historicityas [the] ontologicalmotility [of Dasein] does
not unfold with or towards [Daseinl, but is itself this unfolding and only this
unfolding(Geschehen). WhateversituationDasein encounters it must deal with
- and change. Since the situation is itself "unfolding," it carries within itself
the possibility and necessity of its transformation. This transformation is the
proper categoryof the historicityof Daseins. It has been discoveredand grasped
by Marx on the ground worked by Hegel and was by no means a fixed or
preconceived idea of humanity, like that concerning the alleged reality of
disjunctionwith the world.
"On the ground worked by Hegel" -- even Landshut speaks of an
"appropriation of the wholeHegelian framework" through Marx, but says: "The
Hegelian identity of consciousness and being, which at first looks like the
opposite of a disjunction of world and human beings, is nevertheless precisely
the ground for its most blatant development. It is exactly for Hegel the
justification of 'spirit' as 'objective', capable of acting in such a manner that it
',. _?~se~~_i~~.~r~~Q~ipg.less~.th~_:\Ul{o.1ding of iheself-determined dialectical
. movement reigning in the world (i,e., in Being), for which people are only
Instruments, manipulated by the 'Cunning of ReasonUl(p:15).18 Ii, however,
criticizesindividualistic, profit-seeking societyfor turning "specieslife into
a means of individual life," and for turning "lhe latter, as an abstraction,
into the purpose of the former, also in its abstract and alienated form."
Marcuse returned to this theme often. See, e.g., his first book on Hegel
([1932] 1987, pp. 123, 159, 280) and his essay on Marx's early writings
([1932] 1972,p. 15).
18. In his book on Hegel's ontology ([1932] 1987, p. 187), which appeared a
yearafter this article, Marcusenotes that "...Hegel'sprogrammaticclaim in
the introduction to the Logic that the activity of thinking and being...are
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20. In his Logic, Hegel discusses "causality" in the closing chapter of the
second book ([1812] 1969, pp. 558 and ff.) vis-a-vis the Doctrine of
.Essence.: He makes ·it-clear that, like Kant, he considers- subjectivity-tobe ~
exempt from causality in the ~~tural-scientific ~~se. .H~. say~!. for
example, that "In so far as the objectcon-fronts the I~Vlng beln.g In the flf~t
instanceas an indifferentexternality, it can act uponIt mechanically; but m
doing so it is not acting as on a living beings where it enters int~ a
relationship with a living being it does not act on It as a cause!but excues
it. ...With the seizure of the object, therefore, the mechanical process
passes over into the inner process by which the individualappropriates the
object in such a manner as to deprive it .of its pecu.liar. nature
(Beschaffenheit), convert it into a· means for Itself,.~d give I~S.own
subjectivity to it for substance" (pp. 771-72, emphasis In the .onglnal).
Marcuse discusses causality further in his book Hegels Ontologie ([~932]
1987), pp. 99ff. Like Dilthey, who believed that the human studies ~r
Geisteswissenschoften fall outside the purview of strictly causal analysis,
Marcuse believed that cultural facts must be referred back "to a
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